Beyond Communism, Fascism, and Liberalism

Cover. The Lady of Shalott [1888]. Painter: John William Waterhouse RA [1849 - 1917].


This text is an extract from The Fourth Political Theory [2009] by political philosopher, analyst, and strategist Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin. 



In today’s world, politics appears to be a thing of the past, at least as we used to know it. Liberalism persistently fought against those of its political enemies which had offered alternative systems; that is, conservatism, monarchism, traditionalism, fascism, socialism, and Communism, and finally, by the end of the Twentieth century, had defeated them all. It would be logical to assume that politics would become liberal, while all of its marginalised opponents, surviving in the peripheral fringes of global society, would reconsider their strategies and formulate a new united front according to Alain de Benoist’s periphery against the centre. Instead, at the beginning of the Twenty-first century, everything followed a different script.

Liberalism, which had always insisted on de-emphasising the importance of politics, made the decision to abolish politics completely after its triumph. Maybe this was to prevent the rise of political alternatives and to ensure its eternal rule, or because its political agenda had simply expired with the absence of ideological rivals, the existence of which Carl Schmitt had considered indispensable for the proper construction of a political position. Regardless of the rationale, liberalism did everything possible to ensure the collapse of politics. At the same time, liberalism itself has changed, passing from the level of ideas, political programmes and declarations to the level of reality, penetrating the very flesh of the social fabric, which became suffused with liberalism and, in turn, it began to seem like the natural order of things.

This was presented not as a political process, but as a natural and organic one. As a consequence of such a historical transformation, all other political ideologies, passionately feuding against each other during the last century, lost their currency. Conservatism, fascism and Communism, together with their many variations, lost the battle, and triumphant liberalism mutated into a lifestyle: consumerism, individualism, and a postmodern manifestation of the fragmented and sub-political being. Politics became biopolitical, moving to the individual and sub-individual level. It turns out that it was not only the defeated political ideologies that left the stage, but politics itself, and even liberalism, in its ideological forms, exited. This is why it became nearly impossible to imagine an alternative form of politics. Those who do not agree with liberalism find themselves in a difficult situation - the triumphant enemy has dissolved and disappeared; now they are left struggling against the air. How can one engage in politics, if there is no politics?

There is only one way out - to reject the classical political theories, both winners and losers, strain our imaginations, seize the reality of a new world, correctly decipher the challenges of postmodernity, and create something new - something beyond the political battles of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. Such an approach is an invitation to the development of the Fourth Political Theory - beyond Communism, fascism and liberalism.

To move forward towards the development of a Fourth Political Theory, it is necessary to: 

- reconsider the political history of recent centuries from new positions beyond the frameworks and clichés of the old ideologies; 

- realise and become aware of the profound structure of the global society emerging before our eyes; 

- correctly decipher the paradigm of postmodernity; 

- learn to oppose not the political idea, programme or strategy, but the ‘objective’ reality of the status quo, the most social aspect of the apolitical, fractured [post-] society; 

- and finally, construct an autonomous political model which offers a new way and a project for the world of deadlocks, blind alleys, and the endless recycling of the ‘same old things’ [post-history, according to Baudrillard].


'There is only one way out - to reject the classical political theories, both winners and losers, strain our imaginations, seize the reality of a new world, correctly decipher the challenges of postmodernity, and create something new - something beyond the political battles of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. Such an approach is an invitation to the development of the Fourth Political Theory - beyond Communism, fascism and liberalism.'


This book is dedicated to this very problem... This is not dogma, nor a complete system, nor a finished project. This is an invitation to political creativity, a statement of intuitions and conjectures, an analysis of new conditions, and an attempt to reconsider the past.

The Fourth Political Theory is not the work of a single author, but is rather a trend comprising a wide spectrum of ideas, researches, analyses, prognoses, and projects. Anyone thinking in this vein can contribute his own ideas. As such, more and more intellectuals, philosophers, historians, scientists, scholars, and thinkers will respond to this call.

For my own country, Russia, the Fourth Political Theory, among other things, has an immense practical significance. The majority of Russian people suffer their integration into global society as a loss of their own identity. The Russian population had almost entirely rejected the liberal ideology in the 1990s. But it is also apparent that a return to the illiberal political ideologies of the Twentieth century, such as Communism or fascism, is unlikely, as these ideologies have already failed and proven themselves unequal to the challenge of opposing liberalism, to say nothing of the moral costs of totalitarianism.

Therefore, in order to fill this political and ideological vacuum, Russia needs a new political idea. For Russia, liberalism does not fit, but Communism and fascism are equally unacceptable. Consequently, we need a Fourth Political Theory. And if, for some readers, this is a question of freedom of choice and the realisation of a political will, which can always be viewed from a positive or negative position, then for Russia, it is a matter of life or death - ‘to be or not to be’, in terms of Hamlet’s eternal question. 

If Russia chooses ‘to be’, then it will automatically bring about the creation of a Fourth Political Theory. Otherwise, for Russia there remains only the choice ‘not to be’, which will mean to quietly leave the historical and world stage, dissolving into a global order which is not created or governed by us.



The Birth of a Concept

The End of the Twentieth Century - the End of Modernity

The Twentieth century has ended, but it is only now that we are truly beginning to realise and to understand this fact. The Twentieth century was the century of ideology. If, in the previous centuries, religion, dynasties, estates, classes, and nation-states played an enormous role in the lives of peoples and societies, then, in the Twentieth century, politics had shifted into a purely ideological realm, having redrawn the map of ethnicities, civilisations, and the world in a new way. On the one hand, political ideologies represented early and deeply rooted civilisational tendencies. On the other hand, they were completely innovative.

All political ideologies, having reached the peak of their dominion and influence in the Twentieth century, were the product of the new, modern era, embodying its spirit, albeit in different ways and under different symbols. Today, we are rapidly leaving this era. Thus everyone speaks, more and more frequently, of the ‘crisis of ideology’, or even the ‘end of ideology’. For instance, the existence of a state ideology is explicitly denied in the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It is time to address this issue more closely.

The Three Main Ideologies and their Fate in the Twentieth Century

The three main ideologies of the Twentieth century were: 

[1] liberalism [Left and Right] 

[2] Communism [including both Marxism and socialism, along with social democracy] 

[3] fascism [including National Socialism and other varieties of the Third Way - Franco’s National Syndicalism, Perón’s ‘Justicialism’, Salazar’s regime, etc.].

They fought among themselves to the death, creating, in essence, the entire dramatic and bloody political history of the Twentieth century. It is logical to number these ideologies [or political theories] based in part on their significance, as well as in the order of their occurrence, as was done above. 

The first political theory is liberalism. It arose first, as early as the Eighteenth century, and turned out to be the most stable and successful ideology, having ultimately prevailed over all its rivals. As a result of this victory, it proved, among other factors, the justification of its claim to the entire legacy of the Enlightenment. Today, it is obvious that it was liberalism that was the best fit for modernity. However, this legacy was disputed earlier, dramatically, actively, and, at times, convincingly, by another political theory - Communism. 

It is reasonable to call Communism, much like socialism in all its varieties, the second political theory. It appeared later than liberalism as a critical response to the emergence of the bourgeois-capitalist system, which was the ideological expression of liberalism. 

And, finally, fascism is the third political theory. As a contender for its own understanding of modernity’s spirit, many researchers, particularly Hannah Arendt, in particular, reasonably consider totalitarianism one of the political forms of modernity. Fascism, however, turned toward the ideas and symbols of traditional society. In some cases, this gave rise to eclecticism, in others - to the desire of conservatives to lead their own revolution instead of resisting another’s, and leading their society in the opposite direction, such as Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Dmitry Merezhkovsky, and so on. 

Fascism emerged later than the other major political theories and vanished before them. The alliance of the first political theory with the second political theory, as well as Hitler’s suicidal geopolitical miscalculations, caused it to expire prematurely. The third political theory was a victim of ‘homicide’, or perhaps ‘suicide’, not living long enough to see old age and natural decay, in contrast to the ideology of the Soviet Union. Therefore, this bloody vampiric ghost tinged with an aura of ‘absolute evil’ is attractive to the decadent tastes of postmodernity, and is still used as a bogeyman to frighten humanity.

With its disappearance, fascism cleared the field for the battle between the first and second political theories. This battle took the form of the Cold War and gave birth to the strategic geometry of the bipolar world which lasted for nearly half a century. By 1991, the first political theory, liberalism, had defeated the second political theory, socialism. This marked the global decline of Communism. 

As a result, by the end of the Twentieth century, liberal theory is the only one remaining of the three political theories of modernity that is capable of mobilising the vast masses throughout the entire world. Yet, now that it is left on its own, everyone speaks in unison about ‘the end of ideology’. Why?

The End of Liberalism and the Arrival of Postliberalism

It turns out that the triumph of liberalism, the first political theory, coincided with its end. This only seems to be a paradox.

Liberalism had been an ideology from the start. It was not as dogmatic as Marxism, but was no less philosophical, graceful, and refined. It ideologically opposed Marxism and fascism, not only undertaking a technological war for survival, but also defending its right to monopolise its own image of the future. While the other competing ideologies were in existence, liberalism continued and grew stronger precisely as an ideology, in other words as a set of ideas, viewpoints, and projects that are typical for a historical subject. Each of the three political theories had its own subject. 

The subject of Communism was class. Fascism’s subject was the state, in Italian Fascism under Mussolini, or race in Hitler’s National Socialism. In liberalism, the subject was represented by the individual, freed from all forms of collective identity and any ‘membership’ [l’appartenance].

While the ideological struggle had formal opponents, entire nations and societies, at least theoretically, were able to select their subject of choice - that of class, racism or statism, or individualism. The victory of liberalism resolved this question: the individual became the normative subject within the framework of all mankind. 

This is when the phenomenon of globalisation entered the stage, the model of a post-industrial society makes itself known, and the postmodern era begins. From now on, the individual subject is no longer the result of choice, but is a kind of mandatory given. Man is freed from his ‘membership’ in a community and from any collective identity, and the ideology of ‘human rights’ becomes widely accepted, at least in theory, and is practically compulsory. 


'This is when the phenomenon of globalisation entered the stage, the model of a post-industrial society makes itself known, and the postmodern era begins. From now on, the individual subject is no longer the result of choice, but is a kind of mandatory given. Man is freed from his ‘membership’ in a community and from any collective identity, and the ideology of ‘human rights’ becomes widely accepted, at least in theory, and is practically compulsory.'


Humanity under liberalism, comprised entirely of individuals, is naturally drawn toward universality and seeks to become global and unified. Thus, the projects of ‘world government’ or globalism are born.

A new level of technological development makes it possible to achieve independence from the class structuralisation of industrial societies, in other words, post-industrialism. 

The values of rationalism, scientism, and positivism are recognised as ‘veiled forms of repressive, totalitarian policies’, or the grand narrative, and are criticised. At the same time, this is accompanied by the glorification of total freedom and the independence of the individual from any kind of limits, including reason, morality, identity [social, ethnic, or even gender], discipline, and so on. This is the condition of postmodernity.

At this stage, liberalism ceases to be the first political theory and becomes the only post-political practice. Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ arrives, economics in the form of the global capitalist market, replaces politics, and states and nations are dissolved in the melting pot of world globalisation. 

Having triumphed, liberalism disappears and turns into a different entity - into postliberalism. It no longer has political dimensions, nor does it represent free choice, but instead becomes a kind of historically deterministic ‘destiny’. This is the source of the thesis about post-industrial society: ‘economics as destiny’.

Thus, the beginning of the Twenty-first century coincides with the end of ideology - that is, all three of them. Each met a different end: the third political theory was destroyed in its ‘youth’, the second died of decrepit old age, and the first was reborn as something else - as postliberalism and the ‘global market society’. In any case, the form which all three political theories took in the Twentieth century is no longer useful, effective, or relevant. They lack the ability to explain contemporary reality or to help us understand current events, and are incapable of responding to the new global challenges. 

The need for the Fourth Political Theory stems from this assessment.

The Fourth Political Theory as Resistance to the Status Quo

The Fourth Political Theory will not simply be handed to us without any effort. It may or may not emerge. The prerequisite for its appearance is dissent. That is, dissent against postliberalism as a universal practice, against globalisation, against postmodernity, against the ‘end of history’, against the status quo, and against the inertia of the processes of civilisation at the dawn of the Twenty-first century. 

The status quo and this inertia do not presuppose any political theories whatsoever. A global world can only be ruled by the laws of economics and the universal morality of ‘human rights’. All political decisions are replaced by technical ones. Machinery and technology substitute for all else. The French philosopher, Alain de Benoist, terms this la gouvernance, or ‘micromanagement’. Managers and technocrats take the place of the politician who makes historical decisions, optimising the logistics of management. Masses of people are equated to a mass of identical objects. For this reason, postliberal reality, or, rather, virtuality increasingly displacing reality from itself, leads straight to the complete abolition of politics.

Some may argue that the liberals lie to us when they speak of the ‘end of ideology’ [this was my debate with the philosopher, Alexander Zinoviev]; ‘in reality’, they remain believers in their ideology and simply deny all others the right to exist. This is not exactly true. When liberalism transforms from being an ideological arrangement to the only content of our extant social and technological existence, then it is no longer an ‘ideology’, but an existential fact, an objective order of things. It also causes any attempt to challenge its supremacy as being not only difficult, but also foolish. In the postmodern era, liberalism moves from the sphere of the subject to the sphere of the object. Potentially, this will lead to the complete replacement of reality by virtuality.

The Fourth Political Theory is conceived as an alternative to postliberalism, but not as one ideological arrangement in relation to another. Instead, it is as an incorporeal idea opposed to corporeal matter; as a possibility entering into conflict with the actuality, as that which is yet to come into being attacking that which is already in existence. 

At the same time, the Fourth Political Theory cannot be the continuation of either the second political theory or the third. The end of fascism, much like the end of Communism, was not just an accidental misunderstanding, but the expression of a rather lucid historical logic. They challenged the spirit of modernity... and lost.

This means that the struggle with the postmodern metamorphosis of liberalism into the form of postmodernity and globalisation should be qualitatively different; it must be based on new principles and propose new strategies. 

Nevertheless, the starting point of this ideology is precisely the rejection of the very essence of postmodernity. This starting point is possible - but neither guaranteed, nor ordained by fate - because it arises from man’s free will and his spirit, rather than an impersonal historical process.

However, this essence [much like the rationale behind modernity itself - imperceptible earlier, but later realising its essence so fully that it exhausted its internal resources and switched to the mode of ironically recycling its earlier stages] is something completely new, previously unknown, and only surmised intuitively and fragmentarily during the earlier stages of ideological history and the ideological struggle.

The Fourth Political Theory is a ‘crusade’ against: 

- postmodernity; 

- the post-industrial society; 

- liberal thought realised in practice; 

- and globalisation, as well as its its logistical and technological bases.

If the third political theory criticised capitalism from the Right, and the second from the Left, then the new stage no longer features this political topography: it is impossible to determine where the Right and the Left are located in relation to postliberalism. There are only two positions: compliance [the centre] and dissent [the periphery]. Both positions are global. 

The Fourth Political Theory is the amalgamation of a common project and arises from a common impulse to everything that was discarded, toppled, and humiliated during the course of constructing ‘the society of the spectacle’ [constructing postmodernity]. ‘The stone that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone’. The philosopher Alexander Sekatsky rightly pointed out the significance of ‘marginalia’ in the formation of a new philosophical age, suggesting the term ‘metaphysics of debris’ as a metaphor.

The Battle for Postmodernity

The Fourth Political Theory deals with the new reincarnation of an old enemy. It challenges liberalism, much like the second and third political theories of the past, but it does so under new conditions. The principal novelty of these conditions lies in the fact that of all the three great political ideologies, only liberalism secured the right to the legacy behind the spirit of modernity and obtained the right to create the ‘end of history’ based on its own premises. 

Theoretically, the end of history could have been different: a ‘planetary Reich’, if the Nazis had won, or ‘global Communism’, had the Communists been right. However, the ‘end of history’ has turned out to be, precisely, liberal... But since this is the case, then any appeals to modernity and its assumptions, to which the representatives of the second [to a greater extent] and third political theories appealed in varying degrees, lose their relevance. They lost the battle for modernity as the liberals triumphed. For this reason, the issue of modernity, and, incidentally, of modernisation, may be removed from the agenda. Now the battle for postmodernity begins. 

It is here that new prospects open up for the Fourth Political Theory.

Rethinking the Past and Those Who Lost

The second and third political theories are unacceptable as starting points for resisting liberalism, particularly because of the way in which they understood themselves, what they appealed to, and how they operated. They positioned themselves as contenders for the expression of the soul of modernity and failed in that endeavour. Yet, nothing stops us from rethinking the very fact of their failure as something positive, and recasting their vices as virtues.

The second and third political theories recognised themselves as contenders for the expression of modernity’s spirit. And these claims came crashing down. Everything related to these unfulfilled intentions in the previous ideologies is uninteresting for the creators of the Fourth Political Theory. However, we should attribute the very fact that they lost to one of their advantages rather than their disadvantages. By losing, they proved that they did not belong to the spirit of modernity, which, in turn, led to the postliberal matrix. Herein lie their advantages. Moreover, this means that the representatives of the second and third political theories, either consciously or unconsciously, stood on the side of Tradition, although without drawing the necessary conclusions from this, or even not recognising it at all. 

The second and third political theories must be reconsidered, selecting in them that which must be discarded and that which has value in itself. As complete ideologies, trying to manifest themselves in a literal sense, they are entirely useless, either theoretically or practically. However, certain marginal elements which advocated ideas that were generally not implemented, and which remained on the periphery or in the shadows [let us recall the ‘metaphysics of debris’ once again], may, unexpectedly, turn out to be extremely valuable and saturated with meaning and intuition.

The Return of Tradition and Theology

Tradition [religion, hierarchy, and family] and its values were overthrown at the dawn of modernity. Actually, all three political theories were conceived as artificial ideological constructions by people who comprehended, in various ways, ‘the death of God’ [Friedrich Nietzsche], the ‘disenchantment of the world’ [Max Weber], and the ‘end of the sacred’. This was the core of the New Era of modernity: man came to replace God, philosophy and science replaced religion, and the rational, forceful, and technological constructs took the place of revelation.

However, if modernism is exhausted in postmodernity, then at the same time, the period of direct ‘theomachy’[a war or struggle against God or among or against the gods] comes to an end along with it. Postmodern people are not inimical towards religion, but rather, indifferent. Moreover, certain aspects of religion, as a rule, such as Satanism, and the ‘demonic texture’ of postmodernist philosophers are quite appealing to many postmodern individuals. In any case, the era of persecuting Tradition is over, although, following the logic of postliberalism, this will likely lead to the creation of a new global pseudo-religion, based on scraps of disparate syncretic cults, rampant chaotic ecumenism, and ‘tolerance’. While this turn of events is, in some ways, even more terrifying than direct and uncomplicated dogmatic atheism and materialism, the decrease in the persecution of faith may offer an opportunity, if the representatives of the Fourth Political Theory act consistently and uncompromisingly in defending the ideals and the values of Tradition.


'Tradition [religion, hierarchy, and family] and its values were overthrown at the dawn of modernity .... all three political theories were conceived as artificial ideological constructions by people who comprehended, in various ways, ‘the death of God’, the ‘disenchantment of the world’ , and the ‘end of the sacred’. This was the core of the New Era of modernity: man came to replace God, philosophy and science replaced religion, and the rational, forceful, and technological constructs took the place of revelation.'


It is now safe to institute a political program that was once outlawed by modernity. It no longer appears as foolish and doomed for failure as before, because everything in postmodernity looks foolish and doomed for failure, including its most ‘glamorous’ aspects. It is not by chance that the heroes of postmodernity are ‘freaks’ and ‘monsters’ ,’transvestites’ and ‘degenerates’ - this is the law of style. Against the backdrop of the world’s clowns, nothing and no one could look ‘too archaic’, not even the people of Tradition who ignore the imperatives of modern life. The fairness of this assertion is not only proven by the significant achievements of Islamic fundamentalism, but also by the growing influence of extremely archaic Protestant sects [Dispensationalists, Mormons, and so on] on American foreign policy. George W. Bush went to war in Iraq because, in his own words, ‘God told me to invade Iraq’! This is quite in keeping with his Protestant Methodist teachers.

Thus, the Fourth Political Theory may easily turn toward everything that preceded modernity in order to draw its inspiration. The acknowledgement of ‘God’s death’ ceases to be the mandatory imperative for those who want to stay relevant. The people of postmodernity are already so resigned to this event that they can no longer understand it - ‘Who died exactly?’ But, in the same way, the developers of the Fourth Political Theory can forget about this ‘event’: ‘We believe in God, but ignore those who talk about His death, much like we ignore the words of madmen’. 

This marks the return of theology, and becomes an essential element of the Fourth Political Theory. When it returns, postmodernity [globalisation, postliberalism, and the post-industrial society] is easily recognized as ‘the kingdom of the Antichrist’ [or its counterparts in other religions - ‘Dajjal’ for Muslims, ‘Erev Rav’ for the Jews, and ‘Kali Yuga’ for Hindus, and so forth]. This is not simply a metaphor capable of mobilising the masses, but a religious fact - the fact of the Apocalypse.

Myths and Archaism in the Fourth Political Theory

If atheism, in the New Era, ceases to be something mandatory for the Fourth Political Theory, then the theology of monotheistic religions, which at one time displaced other sacred cultures, will not be the ultimate truth, either [or rather, may or may not be]. Theoretically, nothing limits the possibilities for an in-depth readdressing of the ancient archaic values, which can take their place in the new ideological construction upon being adequately recognised and understood. Eliminating the need to adjust theology to the rationalism of modernity, the adherents of the Fourth Political Theory are free to ignore those theological and dogmatic elements in monotheistic societies which were influenced by rationalism, especially in their later stages. The latter led to the appearance of deism upon the ruins of Christian European culture, followed by atheism and materialism, during the phased development of the program of the modern age.

Not only the highest supra-mental symbols of faith can be taken on board once again as a new shield, but so can those irrational aspects of cults, rites, and legends that have perplexed theologians in earlier ages. If we reject the idea of progress that is inherent in modernity [which as we have seen, has ended], then all that is ancient gains value and credibility for us simply by virtue of the fact that it is ancient. ‘Ancient’ means good, and the more ancient — the better. Of all creations, Paradise is the most ancient one. The carriers of the Fourth Political Theory must strive toward rediscovering it in the near future.

Heidegger and the ‘Event’ [Ereignis] 

Finally, we can identify the most profound - ontological!* - foundation for the Fourth Political Theory. Here, we should pay attention not only to theologies and mythologies, but also to the reflective philosophical experience of one particular thinker who had made a unique attempt of constructing a fundamental ontology - the most all -encompassing, paradoxical, profound, and penetrating study of Being. I am talking about Martin Heidegger. 

* ontology [n.] 'the metaphysical science or study of being and the essence of things,' 1660s [Gideon Harvey], from Modern Latin ontologia [c. 1600]. 

A brief description of Heidegger’s concept is as follows: at the dawn of philosophical thought, people [more specifically, Europeans, and even more specifically, the Greeks], raised the question of Being as the focal point of their thinking. But, by making it their primary subject, they risked getting confused by the nuances of the complicated relationship between Being and thought .... Next, it is obvious that in Parmenides’ work, and, finally, in Plato, who placed ideas between man and existence, and who defined truth as that which corresponded to them - the referential theory of knowledge - reached its culmination in failure.

This gave birth to alienation, eventually leading to ‘calculating thinking’ [das rechnende Denken] and then to the development of technology. Little by little, man lost sight of pure Being and pursued the path of nihilism. The essence of technology [based on the relationship between technology and the world] expresses this ever-increasing nihilism.* In the New Era, this tendency reaches its pinnacle - technical development [Ge-stell] ultimately displaces Being and crowns ‘nothingness’. Heidegger bitterly hated liberalism, considering it an expression of ‘the source of the calculative thinking’ which lies at the heart of ‘Western nihilism’.

* nihilism [n.] 1817, 'the doctrine of negation' [in reference to religion or morals], from German Nihilismus, from Latin nihil 'nothing at all', coined by German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi [1743-1819]. In philosophy, an extreme form of skepticism [1836]. The political sense, 'rejection of fundamental social and political structures,' was first used c. 1824 by German journalist Joseph von Görres [1776-1848]. With a capital N-, it refers to the Russian revolutionary anarchism of the period 1860-1917, supposedly so called because 'nothing' that then existed found favor in their eyes.

Postmodernity, which Heidegger did not live to see in its full manifestation, is, in every sense, the ultimate oblivion of Being; it is that ‘midnight’, when nothingness [nihilism] begins to seep from all the cracks. Yet his philosophy was not hopelessly pessimistic. He believed that nothingness itself is the flip side of pure Being, which - in such a paradoxical way! - reminds mankind of its existence. If we correctly decipher the logic behind the unfurling of Being, then thinking mankind can save itself with lightning speed at the very moment of its greatest risk. ‘But where the danger lies, there also grows that which saves’, Heidegger quotes from Friedrich Hölderlin’s poetry.

Heidegger used a special term, Ereignis — the ‘event’, to describe this sudden return of Being. It takes place exactly at midnight of the world’s night - at the darkest moment in history. Heidegger himself constantly vacillated as to whether this point had been reached, or ‘not quite yet’. The eternal ‘not yet’… 

Heidegger’s philosophy may prove to be the central axis threading everything around itself - ranging from the reconceived second and third political theories to the return of theology and mythology. Thus, at the heart of the Fourth Political Theory, as its magnetic centre, lies the trajectory of the approaching Ereignis [the ‘Event’], which will embody the triumphant return of Being, at the exact moment when mankind forgets about it, once and for all, to the point that the last traces of it disappear.

The Fourth Political Theory and Russia 

Today, many people intuitively understand that Russia has no place in the ‘brave new world’ of globalisation, postmodernity, and postliberalism. First, the world state and the world government are gradually abolishing all nationstates in general. Even more important is the fact that the entirety of Russian history is a dialectical argument with the West and against Western culture, the struggle for upholding our own [often only intuitively grasped] Russian truth, our own messianic idea, and our own version of the ‘end of history’, no matter how it is expressed — through Muscovite Orthodoxy, Peter’s secular empire, or the global Communist revolution. The brightest Russian minds clearly saw that the West was moving towards the abyss. Now, looking at where neoliberal economics and postmodern culture has led the world, we can be certain that this intuition, pushing generations of Russian people to search for alternatives, was completely justified.

The current global economic crisis is just the beginning. The worst is yet to come. The inertia of postliberal politics is such that a change of course is impossible: to save the West, unrestrained ‘emancipated technology’ [Oswald Spengler] will search for more efficient, but a purely technical, technological means. This is the new phase in the onset of Ge-stell, spreading the nihilistic stain of the global market over the entire planet. Moving from crisis to crisis and from one bubble to the next, the globalist economy and the structures of post-industrial society only make mankind’s night blacker and blacker. It is so black, in fact, that we gradually forget that it is night-time. ‘What is light?’ people ask themselves, never having seen it. For example, at the time of the eruption of the 2008 financial crisis, thousands of Americans held a demonstration, asking for the government for yet another economic bubble. Could they be any more blunt?


'The current global economic crisis is just the beginning. The worst is yet to come. The inertia of postliberal politics is such that a change of course is impossible: to save the West, unrestrained ‘emancipated technology’ [Oswald Spengler] will search for more efficient, but a purely technical, technological means. This is the new phase in the onset of Ge-stell, spreading the nihilistic stain of the global market over the entire planet.'


It is clear that Russia needs to follow a different path, its own. Yet herein lies the question and the paradox. Evading the logic of postmodernity in only one country will not be that simple. The Soviet model tried, and collapsed. After that point, the ideological situation changed irreversibly, as did the strategic balance of power. In order for Russia to save herself and others, creating some sort of a technological miracle or a deceptive strategy is insufficient. World history has its own logic. And the ‘end of ideology’ is not a random failure, but the beginning of a new stage - and apparently, the last one.

In this situation, Russia’s future completely relies on our efforts to develop the Fourth Political Theory. We will not go far, and will only delay the inevitable, by attempting to sort those options that globalization offers to us on a local basis, and by trying to correct the status quo in a superficial manner. Postmodernity’s challenge is tremendously significant: it is rooted in the logic of Being’s oblivion and in mankind’s departure from its existential [ontological] and spiritual [theological] roots. Responding to it with hattossing innovation or public-relations surrogates is impossible. Therefore, we must refer to the philosophical foundations of history and make a metaphysical effort in order to solve the current problems — the global economic crisis, countering the unipolar world, as well as the preservation and strengthening of sovereignty, and so on.

It is difficult to say how the process of developing this theory will turn out. One thing is clear: it cannot be an individual effort or one that is restricted to a small group of people. The effort must be shared, and collective. In this matter, the representatives of other cultures and peoples, both in Europe and Asia, can truly help us, since they sense the eschatological* tension of the present moment just as acutely, and are looking for the way out of the global dead-end just as desperately. However, it is possible to state in advance that the Russian version of the Fourth Political Theory, based on the rejection of the status quo in its practical and theoretical dimensions, will focus on the ‘Russian Ereignis’. This will be that very ‘Event’, unique and extraordinary, for which many generations of Russian people have lived and waited, from the birth of our nation to the coming arrival of the End of Days.

* eschatology [n.] 1834, from Latinised form of Greek eskhatos 'last, furthest, uttermost, extreme, most remote' in time, space, degree + -ology [word-forming element indicating 'branch of knowledge, science'. In theology, the study of the four last things [death, judgment, heaven, hell].
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